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ABSTRACT
The paradox of choice leads one to desire more options over fewer options even when
there are negative consequences when choosing from larger arrays (choice overload). The
paradox of choice may be shared among mammals or it could result from cultural influences
relevant to humans. Research with monkeys and young children sheds light on the
developmental precursors of the paradox and may highlight the human-uniqueness of this effect.
I tested young children (41.5–66.0 months) and monkeys (tufted capuchins, rhesus macaques) to
examine choice overload effects. Limited evidence was found that children exhibited choice
overload when choosing among six and twelve toys but not when choosing among three toys. No
evidence of choice overload was found for monkeys, although this may be due to methodological
limitations. Consistent with previous literature on choice and control, monkeys also
demonstrated a preference for more options over fewer.

INDEX WORDS: Paradox of choice, Choice overload, Comparative cognition, Nonhuman
primates, Developmental psychology

Copyright by
Maisy D. Bowden
2021

A Comparative Perspective on the Paradox of Choice

by

Maisy D. Bowden

Committee Chair:

Michael Beran

Committee:

David Washburn
Sarah Brosnan
Bonnie Perdue

Electronic Version Approved:

Office of Graduate Services
College of Arts and Sciences
Georgia State University
May 2021

iv
DEDICATION
This thesis is dedicated to my mother, for getting me started; to Grace, for keeping me
going; and to Andrew, for seeing me through – in this endeavor, and all the others.

v
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to express my sincere appreciation and gratitude to my advisor and
committee chair, Dr. Mike Beran, who not only encouraged my ideas and challenged my
thinking, but has also helped me to navigate the confusing and arduous world of graduate school.
Without your support and guidance, this thesis would not have been possible. Thank you.
Besides my advisor, I would also like to thank my other committee members: Dr. David
Washburn, Dr. Sarah Brosnan, and Dr. Bonnie Perdue, for your insightful questions and
feedback, and for your kindness and flexibility in light of the abrupt changes made due to the
pandemic. A special thank you to Dr. Washburn for helping me grow the seed of this idea into a
full-fledged project plan.
I wish to extend a special thanks to Will Whitham, who acted as a stand-in advisor and
mentor to me in my first couple years of graduate school, and who helped me develop my data
analysis plan for this project. I look forward to a future of collaboration and friendship.
Additionally, I have the unique experience of getting to express my gratitude to my
sister- and father-in-law for their professional assistance in coding in R and helping me interpret
data using generalized linear mixed models. Thank you, Doug and Alina, for wearing two hats
during this process, I love you.
I’d also like to thank the members of my lab for helping me with data collection: Brielle,
Kristin, Joel, Myah, Liz, Emma, Molly, and Will.
My research was made possible by funding from the Georgia State University 2CI
Primate Social Cognition and Evolutionary Behavior Fellowship program.

vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ........................................................................................................ V
LIST OF TABLES ...................................................................................................................... IX
LIST OF FIGURES ..................................................................................................................... X
1

INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................. 1
1.1

Evidence that the need for control is widespread across species ............................. 1

1.2

Evidence for limits to the benefits of control ............................................................. 5

1.3

The paradox of choice .................................................................................................. 7

1.4

Consequences of choice overload: Dependent measures .......................................... 8

1.4.1

Choice satisfaction ................................................................................................... 9

1.4.2

Choice switching..................................................................................................... 10

1.4.3

Performance ........................................................................................................... 10

1.5

Mechanisms of choice overload: Factors that moderate the effects of large arrays
...................................................................................................................................... 11

2

1.5.1

Choice set complexity: Presence of a dominant option ........................................ 13

1.5.2

Preference uncertainty: Articulated ideal point .................................................... 14

1.5.3

Summary ................................................................................................................. 15

1.6

The gap in the literature ............................................................................................ 15

1.7

The present study ....................................................................................................... 17
EXPERIMENT 1 ............................................................................................................ 21

vii
2.1

Participants ................................................................................................................. 22

2.2

General procedure ..................................................................................................... 22

2.3

Experiment 1a: Investigating choice overload in children ..................................... 23

2.3.1

Controlling for prior preferences or dominant alternatives ................................. 23

2.3.2

Procedure ................................................................................................................ 24

3

EXPERIMENT 1 RESULTS ......................................................................................... 26

4

EXPERIMENT 2 ............................................................................................................ 30
4.1

Subjects ....................................................................................................................... 30

4.2

Apparatus ................................................................................................................... 31

4.3

Tasks ............................................................................................................................ 31

4.4

Controlling for prior preferences or dominant alternative.................................... 34

4.5

Experiment 2a: Investigating choice overload in monkeys .................................... 37

4.5.1

Design ..................................................................................................................... 37

4.5.2

Dependent measures: Task switching ................................................................... 39

4.5.3

Dependent measures: Latency to make a task choice ........................................... 39

4.5.4

Dependent measures: Latency to complete a task (task performance) ................ 39

4.5.5

Dependent measures: Dropouts ............................................................................. 40

4.6

Experiment 2b: Determining condition preference in monkeys ............................ 40

4.6.1
5

Design ..................................................................................................................... 40

EXPERIMENT 2 RESULTS ......................................................................................... 42

viii

6

5.1

Experiment 2a: Investigating choice overload in monkeys .................................... 42

5.2

Experiment 2b: Investigating choice condition preference in monkeys ............... 46
DISCUSSION .................................................................................................................. 48

REFERENCES............................................................................................................................ 56
APPENDICES ............................................................................................................................. 65
Appendix A: Instructions and Script for Experiment 1a ................................................... 65
Appendix B: Favorites Questionnaire .................................................................................. 66
Appendix C: Smiley Face Likert Scale................................................................................. 67

ix
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1. Relative difference in latency to choose a toy as a function of choice condition. .......... 26
Table 2. Children’s raw switching rates in each choice condition. .............................................. 28
Table 3. Adjusted odds ratio of children’s toy switching based on choice condition. ................. 28
Table 4. Correlation matrix demonstrating relationship between number of options and children’s
satisfaction score, latency to choose, and switching likelihood........................................ 29
Table 5. Relative difference in children’s satisfaction rating as a function of choice condition. . 30
Table 6. Results of Chi square tests. Monkeys who completed all 600 trials had an expected raw
count of 200 in each cell should the null hypothesis not be rejected. Expected raw counts
for monkeys who did not complete all 600 trials (Gretel and Lychee) were calculated by
dividing their total trial count by three. Cell values that fell outside of the expected
distribution range are signified with an asterisk. Monkey species is indicated by cap
(capuchin) or mac (rhesus macaque). ............................................................................... 47

x
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1. Conceptual model of moderators and consequences of choice overload. Adapted from
Chernev et al., (2015)........................................................................................................ 12
Figure 2. Latency to make a choice as a function of choice set size. Error bars represent 95%
confidence intervals. ......................................................................................................... 27
Figure 3. SELECT screen(s). (a) represents the SELECT screen in the LC condition. (b)
represents the SELECT screen in the IC condition. (c) represents the SELECT screen in
the EC condition. .............................................................................................................. 33
Figure 4. Forced trials. (a) Forced CHASE selection screen. (b) CHASE task: cursor must chase
moving target until contact is made. (c) Forced DEFLECT selection screen. (d)
DEFLECT task: cursor must come into contact with (stationary) ovals. Ovals will appear
in any of the four cardinal directions around the cursor. (e) Forced MAZE selection
screen. (f) MAZE task: cursor must be navigated around blockades to reach the target. 38
Figure 5. Condition Selection and Task Selection screens. Monkeys must manipulate their
joystick in order to select their preferred choice condition (LC, IC, or EC). This selection
will lead the monkey to the corresponding task selection screen with either three (LC),
six (IC), or nine (EC) task options. They must then navigate the cursor to the task of their
choosing, and complete the task to receive their pellet reward. ....................................... 41
Figure 6. The average time it took monkeys to select a task in each choice condition. Error bars
represent 95% confidence intervals. ................................................................................. 43
Figure 7. Monkeys’ overall proportion of task switching as a function of choice condition. Error
bars represent 95% confidence intervals........................................................................... 44

xi
Figure 8. The average time it took monkeys to complete tasks in each condition (“task
performance”). Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. ....................................... 45

PARADOX OF CHOICE

1

1

INTRODUCTION

Humans make countless choices each day. In the first hour after waking up, we may
decide what to wear, what to eat, whether to go into work, the route we want to take, what we
want to listen to on the way, and so on. Nonhuman animals (hereafter, animals) also make many
choices every day, some that are critical to their survival (e.g., who to attack, who to defend,
where to feed, where to sleep) and some that are not (e.g., who to play with, what to investigate,
etc.). Having choices provides us with a perception of control over our environment (Perlmuter
& Monty, 1977), and it enhances our feelings of autonomy and self-determination (Deci & Ryan,
1985). It is widely accepted that possessing a sense of control over one’s environment, that is, by
having choices, is a psychological necessity for the wellbeing of humans and other animals (e.g.,
Leotti et al., 2010; Deci & Ryan, 1985; Washburn, 2015), such that we—humans and other
animals—have evolved to desire and seek out choice and control.
1.1

Evidence that the need for control is widespread across species
In their review of the psychological literature on control, Leotti and colleagues (2010)

argued that perceiving control over one’s environment is evolutionarily adaptive, because
increased control over the environment will improve an animal’s chance of survival. For
instance, when faced with choices, animals are likely to choose the option that provides them
with the most favorable outcome and avoid the option that may cause harm (Leotti et al., 2010).
Leotti and colleagues (2010) point to evidence that indicates control is needed for typical,
healthy development: for instance, healthy individuals tend to overestimate their personal control
in a situation as compared to depressed people, and healthy individuals will attempt to rationalize
outcomes where they did not have control rather than concede any loss of their perceived control
(Alloy & Abramson, 1979; Cannon, 1999; Lewinsohn et al., 1980; Peterson & Seligman, 1987,

PARADOX OF CHOICE

2

as cited by Leotti et al., 2010). Further, the authors point to evidence that overcompensation for a
diminished sense of control can lead to maladaptive, destructive behaviors and mood disorders
(Fenton-O’Creevy et al., 2003; Goodie, 2005; Shapiro et al., 1996, as cited by Leotti et al.,
2010).
To argue that control over choices is adaptive, humans and other species must experience
positive side effects when they have increased control and, correspondingly, experience negative
consequences when their perception of control is diminished. The psychological literature has
demonstrated evidence to support this claim: a diverse range of animals – including flies
(Batsching et al., 2016), pigeons (Catania, 1980; Catania & Sagvolden, 1980), rats (Voss &
Homzie, 1970), and monkeys (Beran et al., 2007; Suzuki, 1999; Washburn, 2015; Washburn et
al., 1991) – are sensitive to the perception of control and prefer having more choices.
The removal of the perception of control is similarly aversive and harmful to many
species. In their classic study on learned helplessness, Seligman and Maier (1967) demonstrated
that dogs who were repeatedly exposed to inescapable shock later did not attempt to escape
electric shock even when it was avoidable. This study led to an abundance of research on the
psychological impacts of choice and lack thereof. The research that followed illustrated that
diminished autonomy or personal control leads to decreased performance, motivation, and
cognitive functioning, and greater likelihood of developing mood disorders and maladaptive
behaviors (Greenberger et al., 1989; Langer & Rodin, 1976; Leotti et al., 2010; Seligman &
Maier, 1967; Washburn et al., 1991; Winocur et al., 1987). For instance, institutionalized
individuals, such as those in nursing homes, prisons, and hospitals, who inevitably are less able
to exercise control over their day-to-day lives, experience reduced physical and psychological
wellbeing and increased learned helplessness (nursing homes: Langer & Rodin, 1976; prisons:
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Schill & Marcus, 1998; hospitals: Raps et al., 1982). Similarly, animals in captivity display
stereotypical behaviors (repetitive, purposeless behaviors induced by stress) likely due, at least in
part, to decreased control over their environment compared to their feral counterparts (Kurtycz,
2015).
Whereas diminished control has harmful effects on psychological well-being, the
opposite is also true: increasing the perception of control greatly benefits satisfaction,
motivation, and performance in humans and other animals (e.g., Beran et al., 2007; Greenberger
et al., 1989; Langer & Rodin, 1976; Leotti et al., 2010; Perlmuter & Monty, 1977; Washburn et
al., 1991; Zuckerman et al., 1978). For instance, pleasure is enhanced when rats can control their
positive reinforcement rather than receive it passively (Faircloth, 1974), and self-controlled
locomotion in rats caused faster healing following surgery than passive movement through an
identical environment (Dru et al., 1975). Additionally, Washburn and colleagues (1991) found
that rhesus monkeys’ performance on computerized tasks improved when they choose their own
tasks compared to their performance when the same task was assigned to them, eliminating the
opportunity for choice. Monkeys demonstrated this improved performance because they
maintained greater motivation when they were provided with choices compared to when no
choice was available (Washburn et al., 1991). Beran and colleagues (2007) replicated this result
in a similar study with capuchin monkeys who were able to choose the order in which they were
able to complete their tasks.
Humans’ performance also appears to improve when an element of control is introduced.
Institutionalized older people who possessed greater control over their day-to-day lives had
greater physical and psychological well-being than those who had less control (Langer & Rodin,
1976). In the same vein, institutionalized older people’s personal locus of control
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(operationalized by the individuals’ ratings of their desire for control multiplied by their ratings
of their perceived control in several areas of life; see Reid et al., 1977) predicted performance on
cognitive tasks better than stress and psychosocial measures, where a higher perceived locus of
control led to higher performance on a cognitive battery (Winocur et al., 1987). Other studies
have found a similar positive correlation between perception of control and performance
(Greenberger et al., 1989; Perlmuter & Monty, 1977), intrinsic motivation (Greenberger et al.,
1989; Perlmuter & Monty, 1977; Zuckerman et al., 1978), and satisfaction (Greenberger et al.,
1989).
Perhaps the most compelling evidence pointing to the adaptive nature of the perception of
control is that animals and humans choose to choose. Rats and children sometimes will choose to
work for food rather than accepting free reward (Singh, 1970), and Perdue and colleagues (2014)
empirically tested rhesus and capuchin monkeys’ preference for choice by providing them the
ability to choose the order in which they completed a task or choose to receive the tasks in a
previously established preferred order. The monkeys maintained a preference for choice, even
when the alternative already provided a preferred task order, providing supporting evidence that
the perception of control is inherently rewarding (Perdue et al., 2014). Finally, humans and
capuchin monkeys will choose an option simply for the sake of not losing that option from a
choice array (Perdue & Brown, 2018; Shin & Ariely, 2004). That is, when given a computerized
choice array in which one icon that leads to a specific task becomes progressively smaller
following each trial where it is not chosen (until the option disappears entirely or is restored to
full size by selecting the option), humans and capuchin monkeys will eventually choose the
diminishing option, even when it is not preferred, rather than losing it entirely. This indicates that
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humans and capuchins would prefer to ‘keep their options open,’ even when some of those
options are less preferred or provide no additional benefit (Perdue & Brown, 2018).
It is important to note that choosing to choose requires a greater expenditure of energy
than being assigned a task; therefore, it must be an important aspect of a choice environment
(Leotti et al., 2010). Together with the evidence that removing an animal’s control over their
environment leads to extensive and long-lasting psychological harm and introducing control
prompts immediate benefits in cognitive performance, mental health, and overall well-being in a
wide range of animal species, it is reasonable to conclude that the perception of control is not just
a desire; rather, possessing some perception of control is a need and is a key component of the
psychology of rats, dogs, pigeons, flies, and primates, and likely extends even more broadly
phylogenetically. Providing choices is one way by which to give an animal control over its
environment, which, for most species, would beget more beneficial outcomes. Therefore, it
would follow that most animals may have evolved to always prefer having more choices – even
when, in some cases, more choices may do more harm than good.
1.2

Evidence for limits to the benefits of control
Psychological research informs us that humans and other animals are prone to making

common, systematic decision-making errors (Furlong & Santos, 2014). Though we may think
that our choices and our preferences are our own, both humans’ and nonhuman primates’
(hereafter, primates) decision making can easily be manipulated through priming effects and
social pressure (see Furlong & Santos, 2014, for a review). Evidence points to environmental
factors that often predispose humans and primates to make certain decisions (and mistakes), at
least when it comes to economic, numeric, or social decisions (e.g., the Prisoner’s dilemma and
numeric discrimination, Furlong & Opfer, 2009, 2012; Furlong & Santos, 2014; inequity
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aversion and cooperation, see Brosnan & de Waal, 2012, for a review). However, intuition may
lead us to believe that when it comes to well-being, we would always be able to choose
correctly—would we not always be able to choose what makes us feel best? The common
perception is that more control, more choices, and more freedom equals more happiness.
Mounting evidence indicates that this is a flawed assumption.
Although in general having control is better than not having control, there are some
notable constraints to the benefits of control. For instance, control itself is not as important as the
perception of control. Individuals perform better when they perceive a greater amount of control
(e.g., when they are making a decision between two equally meaningful alternatives) compared
to less perceived but functionally equivalent control (e.g., when there is an ‘obvious choice,’
where one alternative is clearly better than the other; Perlmuter & Monty, 1977). Further, the
timing of perceived control matters: individuals who chose the first three stimulus-response pairs
in a set of 12 (and were assigned the rest of the stimulus-response pairs) memorized the pairs
equally as well as individuals who were able to choose all 12 pairs (Perlmuter & Monty, 1977).
In contrast, individuals who chose the final three stimulus-response pairs performed as poorly as
those who were provided no choice (Perlmuter & Monty, 1977). Individuals who were able to
choose pairs that were randomly distributed throughout the set of twelve learned the pairs at an
intermediate level (Perlmuter & Monty, 1977). Collectively, this evidence indicates that having
control over a situation (via provided choices) does not necessarily or automatically lead to
greater performance or satisfaction. Finally, mounting evidence indicates that there may be such
a thing as too much control, where too many choices leads to negative outcomes (choice
overload; e.g., Iyengar & Lepper, 2000; Schwartz, 2000, 2004).
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The paradox of choice
Basic economic theory and common intuition lead us to believe that more choice is

always better, and therefore an attraction to larger arrays should not be problematic. In line with
this conception, research demonstrates that people desire more control than they have
(Greenberger et al., 1987), and people are drawn to opportunities to choose from a higher
number of alternatives (Bown et al., 2003; Iyengar & Lepper, 2000). For instance, shoppers are
more likely to approach a jam tasting booth that includes 24 jams than a tasting booth that
includes six (Iyengar & Lepper, 2000), and consumers report greater enjoyment from the
decision-making process when they chose an item out of a larger array compared to participants
who chose from a smaller array (e.g., Haynes, 2009; Iyengar & Lepper, 2000). Surprisingly,
although we tend to be initially drawn toward a higher number of alternatives, people who
choose from a larger array of choices are often more likely to experience negative consequences
associated with their choice (e.g., decreased satisfaction or performance) than individuals who
chose from a smaller array (Iyengar & Lepper, 2000). This phenomenon is known as the paradox
(or tyranny) of choice (Schwartz, 2004).
The paradox of choice has not been fully investigated in nonhuman animals or young
children, and it is unclear whether this phenomenon is a product of sociocultural pressures and is
unique to humans or is a byproduct of broader decision-making mechanisms and therefore likely
to be present early in human development and in other animals. Humans’ initial attraction to
larger arrays could be a result of cultural influences, for instance, via the Western emphasis on
individual freedom, reliance on the internet (which has no physical limits to the number of
options it provides), and marketing strategies that push endless product alternatives. On the other
hand, the tendency to be attracted to a greater number of options (no matter the psychological
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cost) may be a product of general choice mechanisms, because larger arrays are statistically more
likely to include a preferred choice. Further, more choice grants an organism more control over
their environment, and therefore the ability to potentially select more desirable outcomes
(Hutchinson, 2005; Leotti et al, 2010). Broadly, the present study aims to investigate the role of
experience and culture on the paradox of choice by exploring whether monkeys (rhesus
macaques and tufted capuchins) and young children (ages three to five) demonstrate the
behavioral pattern that is typical of the paradox of choice effect in adult humans: an attraction to
choosing from larger arrays that subsequently begets greater negative affect regarding those
choices. I predict that the paradox of choice effect is a byproduct of conserved and evolutionarily
widespread adaptation to prefer choice and control; accordingly, I hypothesize that humans and
monkeys will exhibit a preference for larger arrays and experience more negative outcomes as a
result of making a choice from a larger (compared to a smaller) array.
1.4

Consequences of choice overload: Dependent measures
The trademark of the paradox of choice, and what makes the phenomenon paradoxical, is

the negative experience that come along with too many choices. The negative experience
associated with choosing from too many options is known as choice overload (or overchoice).
Choice overload is ubiquitous in the psychological literature; evidence for choice overload was
documented well before the development of the paradox of choice (e.g., Payne & Bettman, 1992;
Payne et al., 1993). However, until recently (e.g., Chernev et al., 2015) there has not been a
formal operational definition for the choice overload effect. Rather, over the history of the
research on the topic, studies have described a wide range of consequences that occur when we
are faced with too many choices. For instance, Perlmuter and Monty (1977) noted that with
increased choice comes increased potential for frustration, and Schwartz (2000) described the
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general sensation of being overwhelmed, even paralyzed, by too many options. In experiments
that attempted to systematically measure choice overload effects, researchers have used
subjective and objective measures. For instance, choice satisfaction, (e.g., Diehl & Poynor, 2010;
Haynes, 2009; Iyengar & Lepper, 2000), anticipatory and post-decision regret (e.g., Haynes,
2009; Inbar et al., 2011; Sagi & Friedland, 2007) and decision confidence (e.g., Dhar & Nowlis,
1999; Haynes, 2009) have been used as subjective measures of choice overload. On the other
hand, choice deferral (e.g., Iyengar & Lepper, 2000; Chernev, 2005), switching (e.g., Chernev,
2003; Lin & Wu, 2006), option selection (e.g., Gourville & Sourman, 2005), and assortment
choice (e.g., Chernev & Hamilton, 2009) have been used as objective measures of choice
overload.
A recent meta-analysis on choice overload effects attempted to more formally
operationalize the choice overload construct. Chernev and colleagues (2015) demonstrated that
the majority of these measures (satisfaction, confidence, regret, deferral, and switching) reliably
reflect choice overload effects, and can be used interchangeably (Chernev et al., 2015). Chernev
and colleagues (2015) conceded that the dependent variables included in their meta-analysis do
not represent an exhaustive list. For example, Chernev et al. (2015) failed to mention
performance measures and consequences on overall well-being that have been documented in the
literature. Although many consequences of choice overload have been reported, below I will
only describe the dependent variables that will be directly relevant to my study.
1.4.1

Choice satisfaction

Several studies have demonstrated that consumers were less satisfied with their selection
when they chose from a larger array compared to a smaller array. For instance, in Iyengar and
Lepper’s (2000) seminal study, participants chose either from a limited array (six options) or
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extensive array (30 options) of chocolates. Participants in the limited-array condition expressed
greater satisfaction with their chocolate selection than did participants in the extensive-array
condition. These findings have been replicated in other experiments and with differently sized
arrays. For instance, Haynes (2009) found that people reported greater satisfaction with their
prize selection when they chose a prize from three options than people who chose from 10
options, and Diehl and Poynor (2010) found that their participants were less satisfied with their
selection of a computer wallpaper when they choose it from 50 alternatives compared to those
who made a selection from 10 alternatives.
1.4.2

Choice switching

Choice switching describes situations in which a participant makes a selection from an
array and then changes their mind, returns their original selection, and chooses a different option
from the same array. Research has demonstrated that, without access to an articulated ideal point
(a combination of features that represents their ideal option), participants were more likely to
exchange their originally selected box of chocolates to the most popular option than were
participants who did have an articulated ideal point (Chernev, 2003). Similarly, individuals with
a lower ‘need for cognition’ (NFC; which, according to the authors, indicates lower cognitive
resources and higher propensity to rely on heuristics when making decisions in larger arrays)
were more likely to make a switch in larger varieties than in smaller varieties (Lin & Wu, 2006).
This tells us that an increased likelihood to exchange an original selection is indicative of choice
overload.
1.4.3

Performance

Increased choice overload tends to lower the quality of performance subsequent to the
choice. Iyengar and Lepper (2000) demonstrated this in their study in which undergraduate
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students were randomly assigned into one of two groups. All students were informed that they
could write an essay in order to receive extra credit points, but one group was provided with 30
essay topics, and the second group was provided with six essay topics. The results showed that
students in the limited-choice (six option) condition received higher scores on their essays than
did students who were in the extensive-choice (30 option) condition. Similarly, individuals who
had to choose from more laundry detergent options with more differing attributes (i.e., bleach
content, fabric softener content, price, etc.; Jacoby et al., 1974) or who were under time
constraints (Payne et al., 1993) made poorer choices than those who chose from fewer
options/attributes or who were not under time constraints. One reason this may occur is because
as decisions become more difficult (that is, choice overload increases) people rely more heavily
on heuristics, which leads lower quality decisions (Payne et al., 1993).
1.5

Mechanisms of choice overload: Factors that moderate the effects of large arrays
It is important to note that choice overload is highly context dependent. In many cases,

more choice does lead to better outcomes (the more-is-better effect). For instance, if I am
specifically in the mood to eat a beet salad, I will have better luck finding a beet salad – or a
close alternative – at a restaurant that offers 100 meal options than I am at a restaurant that offers
six. Because some studies demonstrate the more-is-better effect and others demonstrate the
choice overload effect, some researchers speculated that choice overload is not a reliable effect
(e.g., Scheibehenne et al., 2010). However, Chernev and colleagues (2015) argued that context
matters; that is, assortment size, alone, is not a reliable predictor of choice overload, but other
factors do reliably moderate the effect of assortment size on subsequent subjective states and
behavioral outcomes (Chernev et al., 2015). Chernev and colleagues (2015) argue that the
seemingly non-significant effect of choice overload found in Scheibehenne and colleagues’
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(2010) meta-analysis is a consequence of the authors’ failure to take into account theoreticallydriven and relevant moderators of choice overload.
In response to Scheibehenne and colleagues’ (2010) meta-analysis, Chernev and
colleagues (2015) proposed and found statistical support for their own theoretical model, which
includes decision task difficulty, choice set complexity, preference uncertainty, and decision goal
as moderators that influence whether a large array will lead to choice overload or the more-is
better effect (Figure 1).

Figure 1. Conceptual model of moderators and consequences of
choice overload. Adapted from Chernev et al., (2015).

Chernev and colleagues (2015) remarked that there are likely even more moderators than
the ones they included in their model. For example, evidence has been found that individual
differences, such as cognitive ability (Lin & Wu, 2006) or certain personality traits (i.e.,
“maximizers” who exhaust every option before making a choice compared to “satisficers” who
settle for ‘good enough’ options; Dar-Nimrod et al., 2009; Iyengar et al., 2006; Schwartz, 2000;
Schwartz et al., 2002) can influence a person’s propensity to experience choice overload. Below,
I will only discuss in detail the specific moderators that are immediately relevant to the present
experiment; however, it is important for the reader to remember that there are many possible
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ways by which to induce the effects of choice overload when choosing options from larger
arrays, and larger arrays, in and of themselves, do not necessarily induce choice overload.
1.5.1

Choice set complexity: Presence of a dominant option

The more complex a choice set is, the more likely a person is to experience choice
overload when choosing from larger arrays. Presumably, this is because choosing from a more
complex set requires more cognitive effort than when a simple choice can be made. One way to
manipulate choice set complexity is through the presence of a dominant option.
In cases where one of the alternatives is obviously superior to the others, it becomes
much easier to make a decision, therefore decreasing the likelihood of choice overload (Chernev,
2006; Payne et al., 1992). For example, choosing between 20 different rings, each with a
precious gem in its center, would be a harder decision and therefore more likely to result in
choice overload than choosing among an array with 19 plastic rings and one diamond ring.
Although not investigating the paradox of choice phenomenon, Perlmuter and Monty
(1977) used a somewhat similar paradigm when investigating the importance of the perception of
control, and they found that choosing between similarly desirable options (i.e., choosing among
gold- and silver-plated pencils) led to a greater perception of control than choosing between
options where there is a clear dominant option (e.g., a gold-plated pencil versus a wooden
pencil). This provides support for the paradox of choice phenomenon: people perceive more
control and enjoy the decision-making process more when making a more difficult decision
(Perlmuter & Monty, 1977), but they are more likely to experience choice overload in these
instances (Chernev, 2006; Dhar, 1997).

PARADOX OF CHOICE
1.5.2

14

Preference uncertainty: Articulated ideal point

Preference uncertainty refers to an individual’s predetermined product or attribute
preferences (or lack thereof). When an individual is uncertain of their preferences, they are more
likely to experience choice overload when making a selection from a larger array than are
individuals who have clear, definite preferences (Chernev, 2003; Mogilner et al., 2008). The
opposite is true of individuals who do possess clear predetermined preferences, who are more
likely to defer choice and exhibit weaker preferences when choosing from a smaller array
compared to a larger array (Chernev, 2003; Mogilner et al., 2008). These preferences can arise
out of an individual’s prior expertise or their articulated ideal point.
Possessing an articulated ideal point means that you have specific set of features or a
specific item in mind that represents your ideal option. In the example I described earlier in the
paper I indicated that, if I were in the mood to order a beet salad, I would have better luck (and
more likely be satisfied) by going to a restaurant with a large menu over a restaurant with a small
menu. My yearning for a beet salad is an example of an articulated ideal point: it is the
combination of attributes that I know would most satisfy me. Even if my exact preference (i.e.,
my ideal combination of attributes) is not met, I am still more likely to find a close second that
matches at least some of my ideal attributes – perhaps a pear salad – when I am choosing from a
larger array. Therefore, it should follow that, if an individual has an articulated ideal preference,
a larger array should lead to a more-is-better effect. Research supports this claim: participants
who had an articulated ideal point (i.e., a preferred type of chocolate, or preferred attributes of
chocolate) were less likely to switch their choice when they chose from a large array and more
likely to switch their choice when they chose from a smaller array (Chernev, 2003). On the other
hand, an individual who does not have an articulated ideal point should fare better from a smaller
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selection; for instance, if I was not yearning a particular food, I should ultimately be more
satisfied with my selection at the restaurant that provides menu choices. Research supports this
claim as well: participants without a strong preference for chocolate type or chocolate attributes
were more likely to switch their selection after choosing from larger arrays (Chernev, 2003).
1.5.3

Summary

A person’s propensity to choice overload can be influenced by a number of factors,
including the presence of a dominant option or a person's articulated ideal point. Having to
choose from large arrays that do not have a clear “winner” (a dominant option or a preferred
choice) is more likely to cause choice overload because more cognitive effort is required to
weigh the relative benefits and disadvantages of the alternatives, which increases as the array
increases in size.
1.6

The gap in the literature
While extensive evidence supports the paradox of choice theory in human adults, very

little research on this topic has been conducted with children and animals. Indeed, to my
knowledge, no one has directly investigated the paradox of choice or choice overload in animals.
However, Addessi and colleagues (2010) indirectly tested this question by investigating capuchin
monkeys’ preference for variety versus monotony. In this study, capuchins chose between two
tokens. If the variety token was chosen, monkeys could choose a food item from ten different
options, where one option was a highly-preferred choice and the other nine were less-preferred
choices. Alternatively, if the monotony token was chosen, monkeys could choose a food item
from ten identical, highly-preferred options. Consistent with the human data, capuchins preferred
to make a choice from the array that included a single preferred option (the variety option).
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However, unlike human tendencies, the monkeys tended to choose a less-preferred food from the
array (Addessi et al., 2010).
Similarly, to my knowledge only one study has explored this topic with children, in
which the researchers identified a curvilinear relationship between choice overload and age
(Misuraca et al., 2016). Specifically, the researchers found that children (mean age of 9.8) and
older adults (mean age of 76.6) experienced greater difficulty and less satisfaction when
choosing from larger arrays than smaller arrays (consistent with the choice overload effect).
However, when compared to adolescents (mean age of 16) and younger adults (mean age of
32.2), children and older adults experienced greater satisfaction and less regret when choosing
from larger arrays (Misuraca et al., 2016). In other words, children and older adults were less
susceptible to choice overload effects than were teens and younger adults (Misuraca et al., 2016)
even though they did still experience such choice overload.
This study included a few important limitations; for instance, the dependent measure of
satisfaction was based on children’s rankings on a Likert scale, which, the authors noted, other
research has demonstrated is not a reliable measure of children’s feelings and opinions
(Markopoulos et al., 2008, as cited by Misuraca et al., 2016; see also Mellor & Moore, 2013).
Further, the authors remarked that children’s and seniors’ reports of greater satisfaction on their
choice of cookie might have been a consequence of the documented differences between age and
preference for sugar: older adults and children have been shown to have a stronger sweet tooth
than adolescents and younger adults (e.g., Coldwell et al., 2009; Desor & Beauchamp, 1987;
Walter & Soliah, 1995, as cited by Misuraca et al., 2016).
The current state of the literature leaves much to be desired regarding our knowledge of
the paradox of choice effect in animals and young children. An investigation of these populations
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can shed light on the evolutionary foundations and developmental nature of the paradox of
choice effect. Specifically, it will help answer the question of whether the paradox of choice is a
byproduct of cultural influences or a more widespread phenomenon likely grounded in
mechanisms of choice behavior shared across species. That is, is it a result of cultural practices
or is it a basic feature of decision making that has led us to always desire more choices, even
when more choices ultimately leave us feeling less happy or more overwhelmed? Importantly,
the answer to this question will better our understanding of choice behavior and cognitive
processes more generally. That is, this research may help us understand whether the human
tendency to seek out and expend effort to access more choices, even when it diminishes our wellbeing, is a result of cultural norms and the mindset that more choice is always better, or if we are
biologically driven to always seek out more choice regardless of the psychological cost.
Further, this research could have important practical implications, especially for humans
and other animals whose choice arrays are provided by others. For instance, institutionalized
individuals and captive animals are provided only a subset of options for food and activities each
day compared to their non-institutionalized counterparts. Data collected from this study may
point to what number of alternatives may optimize psychological well-being when individuals
are faced with a difficult decision, or, at least, at what point providing more options may do more
harm than good.
1.7

The present study
As previously mentioned, the tendency to be attracted to a greater number of options may

be a product of cultural influence. Iyengar and Lepper (2000) named examples such as
enterprises that market endless varieties of ice creams and fast food restaurants that encourage us
to “have it your way.” Fasolo and colleagues (2007) noted that, with the advancement of the
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internet, people today have virtually limitless choices. These factors, especially coupled with the
Western value of ever greater personal freedom, may lead us to be attracted to a greater number
of options, even when a greater number of options may ultimately reduce our well-being. Indeed,
Schwartz (2000) pointed out that, because of these advances, people today have more choice
than ever before. That being said, if more choice inherently evokes more happiness, it would
follow that we should see greatly reduced rates of depression compared to past decades
(Schwartz, 2000). On the contrary, depression rates, like our number of choices, are higher than
ever, occurring at as much as 10 times the rate than in the previous 100 years (e.g., Klerman et
al., 1985; Robins et al., 1984, as cited by Schwartz, 2000).
An alternative explanation for our attraction to a greater number of choices is the
adaptive benefit that comes along with more control over the environment. That is, we may be
instinctually driven to seek out more choices (no matter the psychological cost), because more
options means a better chance of finding a preferred choice (e.g., a ripe fruit or a healthy mate)
and more control over our environment (e.g., the ability to avoid a threatening situation).
Decades of research has demonstrated that humans and animals are similarly sensitive to the
perception of control (e.g., Perlmuter & Monty, 1977; Seligman & Maier, 1967; Washburn et al.,
1991) and rely on similar cognitive processes and heuristics when it comes to making decisions
(Brosnan & de Waal, 2012; Furlong & Santos, 2014). Consequently, I hypothesize that the
paradox of choice is a shared phenomenon across species due to shared mechanisms underlying
choice behavior, and therefore will be present early in human development and in other animals.
The present study also addressed limitations found in other studies. For instance, our
measures were primarily behavioral (i.e., latency to make a choice, switching likelihood, dropout
rates, performance) and therefore were not subject to the disadvantages associated with self-
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report data that are often used in other studies. Switching likelihood and performance have been
used as dependent measures of choice overload in previous literature, and so those are valuable
measures here. I proposed that longer latency to make a choice (above and beyond proportional
scanning time) would be indicative of increased cognitive effort; in other words, taking longer to
choose would indicate greater decision difficulty. I also used a modified Likert scale to collect
children’s satisfaction ratings with the toys they choose, with smiley faces that increased in size
(Appendix C). However, past research has demonstrated that children’s responses on Likert
scales are not reliable measurements of their feelings and moods (Mellor & Moore, 2013);
therefore, the satisfaction data acted as a potential secondary, supporting analysis to our other
collected measurements.
In line with Chernev and colleagues’ (2015) meta-analysis on the moderators of choice
overload, I attempted to induce potential choice overload effects by eliminating options that
would be considered objectively or subjectively dominant (i.e., options that include higher
quality attributes or that closely matched the participants’ previously established preferences).
This was important because previous research has demonstrated that individuals are more likely
to experience choice overload at larger arrays when those arrays do not include a clearly superior
alternative or an alternative that matches the participant’s ideal point (Chernev, 2003, 2006).
Finally, I used three, six, and nine options (for monkeys) or three, six, and 12 options (for
children) in the limited-choice, intermediate-choice, and extensive-choice conditions,
respectively. In human (adult) studies, the most commonly utilized number of alternatives is 1624 for the extensive-choice condition (Chernev et al., 2015), and this range falls outside of what
is considered the typical range of items that adult humans can maintain in their working memory
(Miller, 1956). However, it is important to note that paradox of choice effects have been found at
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relatively smaller arrays (e.g., three versus ten; Haynes, 2009). In this study, I used relatively
smaller arrays (three, six, and nine or 12) for the practicality of designing the computer program
on which the monkeys will be tested. Additionally, nine (for the monkeys) and 12 (for the
children) falls outside the range of what is easily and immediately countable.
Six is the most commonly used number of alternatives for the limited-choice condition
(Chernev et al., 2015), and it falls into range which is considered manageable for adult working
memory (i.e., the “seven plus or minus two” rule; Miller, 1956). Additionally, Reed and
colleagues (2011) found that six was the number most often associated with individuals’ “breakpoint” – that is, the number at which participants switched to preferring fewer options rather than
more. Because six is a widely used and theoretically important number of alternatives, I included
it as an option in the present study. However, because young children (Alloway et al., 2006;
Gathercole et al., 2004) and primates have more limited working memory capacity and cognitive
control than that of adult humans, I also included a smaller range of options (three) as the
limited-choice condition.
I hypothesized that monkeys (tufted capuchins and rhesus macaques) and young children
(ages three to five) would exhibit the paradox of choice effect, such that (a) they would prefer to
choose from a larger array over a smaller or intermediate array and (b) they would experience
choice overload when choosing from the larger array but not the small or intermediate array. In
order to induce choice overload at larger arrays, all of the alternatives in the arrays were made to
be roughly equally preferable, thereby eliminating any objectively dominant options as well as
any alternatives that may have matched any individual’s ideal point. Choice overload was
measured by evaluating children and monkeys’ propensity to switch and latency to choose,
children’s satisfaction ratings, and monkeys’ task performance. Because this was the first time
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the paradox of choice was explored in very young children and nonhuman primates, I did not
make any a priori predictions about species or age differences – rather, I expected there to be a
wide range of individual differences within each species and age.
2

EXPERIMENT 1

The goal of Experiment 1a and Experiment 1b was to determine whether children (three
to five years old) exhibited a paradox of choice effect. I hypothesized that children would
experience the paradox of choice, such that (a) they would prefer to choose from a larger array
over a small or intermediate array and (b) they would experience choice overload when choosing
from the larger array and not from the small and intermediate array. In order to diminish prior
preference effects, before Experiments 1a and 1b were conducted, I first gathered information on
each child’s favorite color and animal, and I used that information to remove prize options from
the experimental arrays that may have closely matched the child’s ideal point. In Experiment 1a,
children were assigned to each of three choice conditions (limited choice (LC): three options;
intermediate choice (IC): six options; extensive choice (EC): 12 options) in random order. The
children were asked to choose a toy from the array of options presented to them, and researchers
measured whether each child chose to exchange their first choice after a 60 second delay
(Appendix A). In Experiment 1b, children were to first choose among three differently sized
buckets (small, representing a limited-choice option; medium, representing an intermediatechoice option; and large, representing an extensive-choice option). The child would have to
choose a bucket without seeing the toys inside; however, the experimenter would explain the
child how many toys were in each bucket, and that they would only get to choose one toy from
whatever bucket they chose. After choosing a bucket, they would then be allowed to select one
toy from the bucket of their choice. I hoped to utilize the data from Experiment 1b in order to
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determine whether children would exhibit the typical preference-for-more effect by
demonstrating a strong tendency to choose the extensive-choice bucket. However, due to school
closures amidst the COVID-19 pandemic, data collection was interrupted: Experiment 1a
concluded prematurely and Experiment 1b was not carried out.
2.1

Participants
Participants were 41 preschool children (ages 41.5 – 66.0 months), recruited from three

daycares in the Atlanta area. All procedures were approved by Georgia State University’s
Institutional Review Board. Parents provided written consent for their child to be in the study,
and verbal assent was attained from each child on the day of testing.
2.2

General procedure
All testing was carried out in the children’s daycare centers, during their daily hour of

free play. A researcher asked the child if they would like to come do their research work for the
day, and, with their assent, the child was taken out of the classroom and brought to a private
room with the researcher(s). The child first completed an unrelated task, either on the computer
or manually, that took anywhere from one minute to thirty minutes. Upon completing that task,
the child was then able to pick out a “prize” (toy) for doing research for the day. The children
were familiar with this procedure; any time children were asked to come back and do research,
they received a prize at the end of the session. The current experiments took place during this
prize selection phase. The children were able to choose a prize out of some array (consisting of
3, 6, or 12 items) of toys that differed on only a few dimensions (i.e., an array of toy vehicles,
plastic animals, or balls).
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Experiment 1a: Investigating choice overload in children
The goal for this experiment was to determine whether children, like adults, exhibited

increased choice overload when choosing from larger assortments when no dominant option/
predetermined preference was available. The independent variable for this experiment was the
assigned choice condition: limited choice (three options; LC), intermediate-choice (six options,
IC) and extensive-choice (12 options; EC) and the dependent variables were the child’s decision
to exchange or keep their first choice, their reported satisfaction with their decision, and their
latency to make an initial choice. Children were assigned to the conditions in pseudo-random
order. It was planned that every child would experience each condition twice, for a total of six
sessions. Because testing was cut short, I was not able to test 20 of the 41 children all six times;
however, every child experienced each condition at least once. Data from all children were
analyzed, including the children who completed fewer than six trials. I hypothesized that
children would exhibit greater choice overload (i.e., increased switching, decreased satisfaction,
and longer latency to choose) when exposed to the EC condition compared to the IC or LC
conditions.
2.3.1

Controlling for prior preferences or dominant alternatives

Before testing began, the experimenters asked each child to indicate their two favorite
colors and animals as well as their favorite toy (Appendix B). We then removed from each
child’s experimental array any prizes that we felt fell in their “favorites” categories based on
these responses. Because this experiment was conducted over the course of a few months and
children’s preferences may have changed during that time, this survey was repeated after the
third trial, and their future prize arrays were adjusted according to their newly recorded
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preferences. We also removed the specific toys that a child chose in any given trial from arrays
in future trials.
Each array included only one toy type (i.e., toy vehicles, plastic animals, or balls) in order
to diminish the number of dimensions on which the toys differed. This avoided a situation in
which one item possessed a quality that made it more appealing than all others to a given child.
This is also why we discussed with each child their preferences before Trial 1 and after Trial 3,
and this is the means by which we hoped to eliminate options that were clearly dominant or
corresponded to a child’s ideal point.
2.3.2

Procedure

Each child was pseudo-randomly assigned to the choice conditions (LC, IC, and EC), and
underwent between three and six testing sessions, based on the data we were able to collect
before testing was discontinued. After completing a different, unrelated task, researchers told the
child they could pick out a toy from a (predetermined) array. The child was presented with three,
six, or 12 similar toy options (i.e., toy vehicles, plastic animals, or balls), according to what
condition they are assigned for that testing session. Each child only chose from one toy type
throughout the duration of the experiment, and that toy type was randomly assigned to each child
based on available toys. Again, these were all highly salient and preferred toys for these children
but not the most preferred. Researchers informed the child that they could choose one prize from
the array to keep and take home. The researchers instructed the child that they could look at the
array for as long as they wanted before selecting the prize they would ultimately take home, but,
as soon as they touched a toy, that would be their selection for the day (Appendix A).
Researchers timed how long the child visually investigated the toy options before making a
selection.
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As soon as a toy was touched, researchers coded the touched toy as the child’s first
choice selection. Next, the researchers told the child that the researchers had to “do some
paperwork” before they could take the child back to class, and the researchers encouraged the
child to play with their new toy while waiting (Appendix A). During this time, the other toys
were all removed from view. The child was then given 60 seconds to play with and manipulate
the toy of their choice while researchers appeared to be otherwise preoccupied.
When 60 seconds expired, researchers then gave the child the opportunity to exchange
their toy (Appendix A). If the child chose to exchange their toy, the researchers placed the firstpicked-toy back into the array, which was then presented a second time, and provided the child
with the same instructions as before: the child could look at the array for as long as they liked,
but as soon as they touched a toy, that toy would be the one they took home.
As soon as the final selection was made, either after the child refused the opportunity to
exchange or selected a second toy, the researcher then asked the child to rate their satisfaction
with their selected toy (Appendix A). Researchers presented the child with five progressively
larger smiley faces (Appendix C) and explained to the child that they should think of the size of
the smiley face as representing how happy they were with their selection (Appendix A). They
then asked the child to rate their satisfaction by pointing to the smiley face that represented their
happiness, and their response was recorded (1 = smallest smiley, 5 = largest smiley; Appendix
C). After the satisfaction-rating phase, the trial was complete, and the child was taken back to
the classroom with their selected toy. In three trials, researchers failed to collect satisfaction
ratings from a child; those trials were excluded from satisfaction rating analyses.
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3

EXPERIMENT 1 RESULTS

To measure possible effects of choice overload in children, I measured children’s latency
to choose a toy, their propensity to switch their original selection, and their ultimate satisfaction
rating in each choice condition (LC = three toys, IC = six toys, EC = 12 toys). Data were
analyzed in R studio. Testing was cut short due to the COVID-19 pandemic and half of all
participants (n = 20) did not complete all six testing sessions. Since non-parametric tests such as
the Friedman’s test cannot accommodate blank cells, general linear mixed effects models were
used to analyze the data so that all trials could be included in analyses.
Overall, the mean latencies to choose a toy in the LC, IC, and EC conditions were 16.60
seconds, 17.75 seconds and 25.19 seconds, respectively. I conducted a general linear mixed
effects model of the effect of condition on latency to choose a toy. In this model, observations
were nested within each child, and the main goal was to determine whether there was a
significant difference in latency to choose a toy as a function of choice condition. To help control
for age and trial-order effects, age and trial number were included as covariates. The model
indicated that children took significantly longer to make a selection in the EC condition
compared to the LC condition, but there was a not a significant difference in the time it took
children to make a toy selection between the LC and IC conditions (Table 1).
Table 1. Relative difference in latency to choose a toy as a function of choice condition.
Condition

Estimate

t-value

p-value

LC

Ref

IC

1.56

0.54

0.593

EC

9.08

3.15

0.002 **

Age

0.16

0.64

0.530

Trial

-0.06

-0.08

0.933
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This result aligned with my hypothesis that children would take longer to choose a toy
when there were more options; however, because this latency was not disproportionately longer
than that of the other conditions (that is, although the EC condition had two or four times as
many choices as the LC and IC conditions, respectively, it did not take more than two or four
times the amount of time to make a decision), this result is likely attributable to the scanning
time necessary to visually inspect larger arrays. However, it is interesting to note that when these
latencies are plotted as a function of set size, it appears that the relationship is not linear, as one
would expect if scanning time were the only cause increased latency (Figure 2). In this study, I
cannot rule out that this is simply a result of increased scanning time, but future studies could
investigate further the relationship between latency to choose and choice set size.

Figure 2. Latency to make a choice as a function of choice set size. Error bars
represent 95% confidence intervals.
I also analyzed children’s propensity to switch their toy in each of the three conditions.
Overall, children chose to switch their toy 49% of the time when they were in the LC condition,
82% of the time when they were in the IC condition, and 85% of the time when they were in the
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EC condition. A Chi-square test assessing differences in switching by choice condition showed
no significant differences in switching in each condition (X2(2) = 3.05, p = .218); however, the
summary tables showed that children switched more in the IC and EC conditions compared with
the LC condition (Table 2).
Table 2. Children’s raw switching rates in each choice condition.
Switch
Choice Condition
LC
IC
EC

No
Raw count (residuals)
45 (0.93)
39 (-0.40)
40 (-0.50)

Yes
Raw count (residuals)
22 (-1.10)
32 (0.47)
34 (0.60)

I then analyzed these switching data further using a generalized linear mixed model,
including age and trial as covariates. The results indicated that children demonstrated nearly
twice the odds of switching in the IC condition than the LC condition after adjusting for age and
trial (Table 3). Similarly, there were twice the odds that children would switch in the EC
condition than the LC condition children (Table 3). These results did not reach significance at an
alpha level of p <.05. However, given that we had to cut short the number of trials collected and
considering the large effect size found here, these results provide promising evidence for our
hypothesis.
Table 3. Adjusted odds ratio of children’s toy switching based on choice condition.
Condition
LC
IC
EC
Age
Trial

aOR
Ref
1.92
2.00
0.97
0.91

95% CI

p-value

0.90 - 4.12
0.94 - 4.26
0.91 - 1.03
0.75 – 1.10

.093
.073
.255
.331
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Table 4 provides an overview of the correlational relationships between the variables
described thus far, as well as children’s satisfaction rating which I have yet to discuss. There is a
small, positive relationship (p = .004) between the number of options provided and children’s
latency to make a choice. There is no correlation between any other variables. This table
previews the lack of relationship between satisfaction rating and all other variables of interest in
this study, suggesting that it was not a reliable measure of choice overload.
Table 4. Correlation matrix demonstrating relationship between number of options and children’s
satisfaction score, latency to choose, and switching likelihood.

No. of options
Satisfaction Score
Latency to Choose
Switching
Likelihood

No. of
options
1.00
-0.04
0.20
0.09

Satisfaction
Score

Latency to
Choose

Switching
Likelihood

1.00
-0.02
0.03

1.00
-0.01

1.00

To explore the effects of choice condition on satisfaction rating, I conducted a general
linear mixed effects model of the effect of condition on rating, controlling for age and trial. The
goal was to determine whether there was a significant difference in satisfaction rating as a
function of choice condition. At the end of each trial, children could rate their satisfaction with
their chosen toy on a scale of 1-5 based on progressively larger smiley faces. The model
indicated that children tended to have lower satisfaction scores in the EC condition (M = 4.58)
compared to the LC condition (M = 4.77), but the effect was not significant (Table 5). Children
in the IC condition also reported lower satisfaction ratings (M = 4.35) than the LC condition, and
this difference was found to be significant (Table 5). These results somewhat align with my
hypotheses, as children did report lower satisfaction scores when choosing from larger arrays;
however, I predicted that children would have the greatest dissatisfaction when choosing from

PARADOX OF CHOICE

30

the EC, which was not the result found here. Furthermore, given the previous research indicating
the unreliable nature of measuring children’s happiness with Likert scales (which we saw
evidence of in our own study; Mellor & Moore, 2013), I would hesitate to draw any conclusions
about the implications of these data.
Table 5. Relative difference in children’s satisfaction rating as a function of choice condition.
Condition

Estimate

t-value

p-value

LC

Ref

IC

-0.44

-2.31

.022 *

EC

-0.20

-1.05

.294

Age

0.01

0.70

.488

Trial

0.04

0.77

.441

4

EXPERIMENT 2

The goal for these experiments was to determine whether and to what degree nonhuman
primates experienced the paradox of choice. In Experiment 2a, monkeys were pseudo-randomly
assigned to each of the three conditions (LC = three task options, IC = six task options, or EC =
nine task options). Data were collected on proportion of task switching, latency to choose a task,
latency to complete a task (“task performance”), and dropout behaviors for each testing session.
In Experiment 2b, I measured the number of times monkeys choose each condition (LC, IC, or
EC) to assess whether monkeys prefer to choose from larger arrays over smaller arrays.
4.1

Subjects
Included in the study were 14 socially-housed capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella; 10

females; aged 8 to 24 years) and five male macaques (Macaca mulatta; aged 17 to 27 years) that
were singly housed but had regular social contact with compatible conspecifics. Five of these
capuchins (3 females; aged 10 to 22) and one macaque (age 21) either did not participate
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regularly or completed very few trials on any given day and therefore were excluded from the
study. All subjects were housed at Georgia State University’s Language Research Center (LRC)
and had extensive experience working on the computer testing systems (LRC-CTS) and with the
SELECT task paradigm. The monkeys were not food or water deprived and engagement with the
LRC-CTS was voluntary for each individual. All procedures conformed to LRC Standard
Operating Procedures and were approved by the GSU Animal Care and Use Committee.
4.2

Apparatus
Monkeys were tested on the Language Research Center’s Computer Testing Systems

(LRC-CTS; Rumbaugh et al., 1989). Monkeys observed a 17-inch computer monitor through
clear face-plates, and monkeys manipulated a joystick that was mounted on the face-plate using
their hand. A pellet-dispenser was also attached to the face-plate, and pellets were automatically
dispensed through a tube to an opening in the face-plate when the monkeys correctly completed
a trial.
4.3

Tasks
In the present experiments, monkeys engaged in variations of computerized psychomotor

tasks. Two of these -- CHASE and MAZE -- have been used extensively in past experiments
(Rumbaugh et al., 1989; Washburn et al., 1989, 1990; Washburn, 1992) and all monkeys in the
present study had previous experience with these tasks or closely related variations. A third task
used in this experiment was named DEFLECT. Although the monkeys were not familiar with
DEFLECT, the task was very similar to others to which the monkeys had been exposed
(including CHASE and MAZE), as it was a psychomotor task that required directing the cursor
(by manipulating the joystick) toward a target on a screen. Monkeys first selected a task to
perform, and then completed one trial of that task. Each trial of a task ended as soon as the goal

PARADOX OF CHOICE

32

was completed and a pellet was awarded (i.e., there is no way to “fail” any of the tasks). The
screen then reset to the choice screen and monkeys were able to select their next task. This
continued until the end of the trial block. In cases where monkeys were unmotivated to engage in
the study, we increased their pellet reward for each completed task trial until they demonstrated
willingness to complete the tasks or we excluded them from further study.
Each of these tasks could be carefully manipulated by the program to control how
difficult they would be to complete. Each task was selected from an initial screen that gave the
monkey an option of which task to complete. I describe that SELECT phase to each trial next,
and then I describe the individual tasks and how the relative difficulties were set for each task for
each monkey.
SELECT Screen: Like the original SELECT experiment (Washburn et al., 1991), the
SELECT screen in this experiment was comprised of a set of arbitrary icons, each of which led,
when selected, to a specific task. The monkeys could select these icons by manipulating their
joystick to control an onscreen cursor. Navigating the cursor to a specific icon initiated the task
that corresponded to that specific icon. In this experiment, the SELECT screen changed
according to the choice condition the monkey was in: in the LC condition, the SELECT screen
only included three task icons; in the IC condition, the SELECT screen included six task icons in
the EC condition, the SELECT screen included nine task icons from which the monkeys could
choose (Figure 3).
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Figure 3. SELECT screen(s). (a) represents the SELECT screen in the LC
condition. (b) represents the SELECT screen in the IC condition. (c) represents the
SELECT screen in the EC condition.

CHASE: In this task, the monkeys controlled a cursor onscreen and moved in
continuously until it made contact with a moving target onscreen. As long as the cursor was
moving, the target was also moving across the screen (the target moved in a saw-tooth pattern
and deflected off of the screen borders so that it gave the impression of bouncing off the walls).
The speed at which the target and the cursor moved vary with the difficulty level of the task and
with each monkey’s preset levels suited to their equivalence criteria (see Section 4.4). When the
cursor was stationary (that is, the monkeys were not manipulating the joystick), the target was
also stationary. As soon as the cursor contacted the target, the monkey received a reward.
MAZE: In this task, the monkeys navigated a simple barrier maze by moving the cursor
around graphic “blockades” in order to reach a target. The target was visible on the screen at all
times (it appeared as a blue square somewhere within the maze), and it remained stationary while
the monkey completed the maze. A pellet was awarded as soon as the monkey’s cursor made
contact with the target. The mazes consisted of either one, two, or three blockades, and the target
and cursor could appear in one of nine different positions on the screen. The number of
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blockades and the positions in which the target and cursor could appear were adjusted according
to the difficulty level of the task.
DEFLECT: In this task, the cursor began in the middle of the screen, and a colored oval
appeared in one of the four cardinal directions around the cursor. The monkey then had to direct
their joystick in the direction of the oval. If moved in the correct direction, the cursor would
jump immediately to the oval, the oval would disappear, and the cursor would return to the
center of the screen. Another oval would then appear in another direction, and so on, until the
monkeys hit a certain, predetermined number of ovals. The number of required ovals varied by
the difficulty level of the task.
Prior to completing the formal tests of Experiment 2a and 2b, monkeys worked on these
tasks to establish approximate equivalence of task preference (see Section 4.4). They then moved
to the test phases. Even with this effort, there was still a concern that strong task biases might
emerge over time. In an attempt to ensure that the choice condition and task decisions the
monkeys made were meaningful (that is, that they did not fall into a rhythm of selecting the same
icon, for example), monkeys only completed 30 testing trials in a given day before being put on a
different task for the remainder of the day. Each monkey completed five testing sessions in each
condition (LC, IC, and EC) for a total of 450 trials across 15 days of data collection. In
Experiment 2b, monkeys completed four testing sessions (150 trials each) in which they were
able to choose their condition (LC, IC, or EC), for a total of 600 trials per monkey in this
experiment.
4.4

Controlling for prior preferences or dominant alternative
Each task (CHASE, DEFLECT, and MAZE) was represented equally across the choice

conditions that were used for the SELECT phase of each trial. That is, the LC condition had one
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CHASE icon in the choice set, one DEFLECT icon, and one MAZE icon. The IC condition had
two identical icons for each those three tasks (totaling six options), and the EC condition had
three identical icons for each task (totaling nine options; Figure 3). Because only three tasks were
used in this experiment, but two of the choice conditions (IC and EC) required more than three
alternatives, it was necessary to include variation within the tasks themselves. If there was not
this intra-task variation, monkeys would only ever have three meaningful options, no matter the
choice condition they were in: a particular version of MAZE, a particular version of CHASE,
and a particular version of DEFLECT1.
At the same time that I wished to create this intra-task variation in order to provide the
monkeys with more meaningful alternatives, I also wanted to prevent the monkeys from
establishing a strong preference for one of the task icons over the others. Should the monkeys
demonstrate a strong preference for a particular task (as they did in the original SELECT
experiment, for example, Washburn et al., 1991), there would then be a clearly dominant option,
which would erase any effects of choice overload at larger arrays. Therefore, I created
approximately equivalently-preferred tasks by titrating the parameters of each difficulty level
and the proportions at which each difficulty level would occur for each task. Additionally, I
ensured that the icons for each task did not provide any indication of what level of difficulty the
chosen task would ultimately be set. The difficulty level of the task was randomly generated
based on a set of predetermined proportions (that is, the proportion that easy, medium, and
difficult versions of the task would appear) after the icon was chosen. Therefore, anytime a

1

In the EC condition, where there would be three icons representing each task for a total of nine icons (see
Figure 3), without variation within the tasks, this situation would be analogous to a child choosing among an array of
nine toys in which three of the options were the exact same ball, three of the options were the exact same plastic
animal, and three of the options were the exact same toy car. In that situation, the child is essentially choosing
between the ball, the animal, and the car, and not among nine different options. For this reason, I introduced varying
difficulty levels (easy, medium, and hard) within each task.
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monkey chose the MAZE icon, for instance, they could not know whether they were about to
play the easy, medium, or hard version of the MAZE task.
The difficulty levels were adjusted for each monkey by increasing or decreasing cursor
speed (CHASE, MAZE), increasing or decreasing target size (CHASE), increasing or decreasing
the number of blockades and adjusting the positions of the target and cursor to require more or
less maneuvering around the blockades (MAZE), and increasing the number of deflections
required to earn a pellet (DEFLECT). After the icon was chosen, the difficulty level of the task
was randomly generated based on a set of predetermined proportions (that is, the proportion that
easy, medium, and difficult versions of the task would appear) which differed for each individual
monkey based on which parameters led them to reach equivalence between tasks.
These customized parameters were created for each monkey after conducting several
weeks of preliminary testing during which, at the end of each testing session, I analyzed the rate
at which each monkey chose each task and manually adjusted the parameters of each task,
making the more preferred task harder and the less preferred task easier. Also, during this time, I
adjusted the relative rate at which the difficulty levels occurred, making harder versions of the
more preferred task occur more often and easier versions of the less preferred task occur more
often. These manual adjustments were made to ensure that monkeys would reach an equivalence
point (i.e., no task chosen at >20% more or less than any other task). After six weeks of this
preliminary testing and manual adjustments, I gained a better understanding of the difficultylevel parameters that were appropriate for each monkey, but monkeys were not consistently
meeting the equivalence criterion more than one or two days in a row. Therefore, the program
was modified to self-titrate the proportions that the difficulty level of each task would appear for
Experiment 2a (described in more detail below). The program did not further titrate the
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difficulty-level settings, such as cursor speed or number of deflections; these parameters were
individually set for each monkey based on the data collected in the previous six weeks and
remained constant for the remainder of the experiment, unless manually adjusted by the
experimenter when deemed necessary. When the monkey progressed to Experiment 2b, the latest
parameters set in Experiment 2a were utilized as the parameters throughout the course of
Experiment 2b (i.e., the program did not continue to titrate proportion of difficulty level of task).
4.5

Experiment 2a: Investigating choice overload in monkeys
The goal for this experiment was to determine whether monkeys demonstrated choice

overload when exposed to larger arrays compared to small and intermediate arrays. The
independent variable was choice condition (LC, IC, EC). The dependent variables of this
experiment included task switching, dropout rate, task performance (operationalized by latency
to complete the task), and the latency to choose a task. Monkeys completed 30 test trials on each
test day for 5 days in each condition, or a total of 450 trials across 15 testing days. I hypothesized
that monkeys would demonstrate choice overload (greater rates of task switching and dropouts,
lower task performance, and longer latency to choose) in the EC condition compared to the LC
and IC conditions.
4.5.1

Design

Each day, monkeys had to reestablish their equivalent preference point between tasks by
progressing through at least one exposure session. The exposure session began with six forced
trials, two forced trials of each task type (Figure 4) and was followed by 30 exposure trials.
These exposure trials looked identical to an LC test condition: there were three task icons on the
screen from which monkeys could choose (Figure 3). After choosing and completing the task (by
earning a pellet reward), the program returned to the three-choice screen, and the monkey could
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Figure 4. Forced trials. (a) Forced CHASE selection screen. (b) CHASE task: cursor must
chase moving target until contact is made. (c) Forced DEFLECT selection screen. (d)
DEFLECT task: cursor must come into contact with (stationary) ovals. Ovals will appear in
any of the four cardinal directions around the cursor. (e) Forced MAZE selection screen. (f)
MAZE task: cursor must be navigated around blockades to reach the target.
make another selection. If, at the end of the 30 trials, any task was chosen 20-100% less often
than another task, the program automatically increased the likelihood the easy version of that
task would appear by 20% and decreased the likelihood of the medium and hard versions by 10%
each. Likewise, if any task was chosen 20-100% more often than another task at the end of the
30 trials, the program automatically increased the likelihood the hard version of that task would
appear by 20% and decreased the likelihood the medium and easy versions by 10% each. In
either of those cases, the program began a new training session, commencing with six new
forced trials. If all tasks were chosen at approximate equivalence (no task was chosen more than
20% more frequently than another task), the program would progress into the testing phase.
The testing phase consisted of 30 trials (no forced trials) in one of the choice conditions
(LC = three task icons; IC = six task icons; EC = nine task icons; Figure 3). The task icons could
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appear in any of nine different positions around the perimeter of the screen. In the EC condition,
each of the nine positions was filled with a task icon, and the location of each icon was randomly
generated. In the LC and IC conditions, the program randomly generated three or six icons
(respectively) into the nine positions.
Monkeys were pseudo-randomly assigned to the three conditions so that in each block,
each condition was presented once. At the end of the 30 testing trials, the program ended and the
monkey would begin a different, unrelated task until the end of the day. On any given day,
monkeys only completed one of the choice conditions in the testing phase. Across the entirety of
the experiment, monkeys performed each of the choice conditions five times.
4.5.2

Dependent measures: Task switching

For every testing session, monkeys had 30 opportunities to select a task and 29
opportunities to switch. Task switching was measured as the proportion of times monkeys
choose the same task or a different task across consecutive trials (e.g., Trial 1 to Trial 2, Trial 2
to Trial 3, etc.).
4.5.3

Dependent measures: Latency to make a task choice

Latency to make a choice was measured as the amount of time (in ms) that passed after
the task options appear on the screen and before the monkey selected a task from the SELECT
array.
4.5.4

Dependent measures: Latency to complete a task (task performance)

Because the tasks were designed so that they were impossible to fail, task performance
was measured as the amount of time (in ms) that it took the monkey to complete the task. The
timer started after the task appeared and ended when a pellet was awarded.
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Dependent measures: Dropouts

If, after initiating a trial by selecting a task icon, the monkey did not engage in the task
(that is, they did not manipulate their joystick in any way) for 60 seconds, the trial was aborted
(“dropout”) and the program returned to the choice selection screen. No pellets were awarded.
This dropout counted as a trial toward the session total.
4.6

Experiment 2b: Determining condition preference in monkeys
The goal for this experiment was to determine from what condition (LC, IC, EC)

monkeys preferred to choose a task. The dependent variable was the proportion of trials in which
each of the conditions was selected (out of 600 trials). I hypothesized that, like humans, rhesus
macaques and capuchin monkeys would prefer the EC condition.
4.6.1

Design

Rather than the start screen appearing as the SELECT array of potential task icons (i.e.,
CHASE, MAZE, DEFLECT), in Experiment 2a, monkeys began the experiment with an array of
choice condition icons (Figure 5). Each icon represented one of the choice array sizes: LC, IC, or
EC. As in Experiment 2a, these icons could appear in any of the nine positions of the screen, and
the program randomly generated the position of each icon at the beginning of each new trial.
Depending on the condition icon chosen, the monkey was then led to the corresponding task
selection screen which was identical to the SELECT phase of trials in Experiment 2a. In this
experiment, monkeys essentially encountered two SELECT screens in each trial. First, monkeys
encountered a SELECT screen in which they chose their choice conditions, LC, IC, or EC. On
this screen, monkeys chose between three arbitrary icons, each of which, if selected, would lead
to a second corresponding SELECT screen (Figure 5). The subsequent SELECT screen(s) would
appear exactly as seen in Experiment 2a, presenting either three, six, or nine task icons,
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depending on which choice condition (LC, IC, or EC) was chosen on the first SELECT screen.
Unlike Experiment 2a, in which monkeys were only exposed to a single choice condition on a
given day, because monkeys were given the freedom to choose the choice condition in
Experiment 2b, they might have seen one, two, or all three choice conditions (task selection
screens) on any given day.

Figure 5. Condition Selection and Task Selection screens. Monkeys must manipulate their
joystick in order to select their preferred choice condition (LC, IC, or EC). This selection will
lead the monkey to the corresponding task selection screen with either three (LC), six (IC), or
nine (EC) task options. They must then navigate the cursor to the task of their choosing, and
complete the task to receive their pellet reward.
After selecting an array size from which subsequently to choose a specific task, the
monkey was then able to choose the task itself (CHASE, DEFLECT, or MAZE) as they did in
Experiment 2a. If they chose the LC array size, there was one icon for each task. If they chose
the IC array size, there were two icons of each task, and choice of the EC array size led to 3

PARADOX OF CHOICE

42

icons of each task being available to choose from. Monkeys then chose one task icon. After the
monkey completed a single trial of the selected task, the program returned to the Condition
SELECT screen and monkeys had a new opportunity to choose the choice condition (i.e., the
number of task icons) and, subsequently, the task.
5
5.1

EXPERIMENT 2 RESULTS

Experiment 2a: Investigating choice overload in monkeys
In this experiment, I looked for evidence of choice overload effects in rhesus macaques

and capuchin monkeys by measuring the monkeys’ latency to select a task, the proportion of
trials in which they switched tasks, their task performance (i.e., the time it took for the monkeys
to complete the task), and their dropout rate (i.e., the proportion of trials in which they “gave up”
on a game after selecting it), when presenting them with either three (LC), six (IC), or nine (EC)
task options. After data collection was complete, I found that dropouts were very rare or
nonexistent, occurring only between 0-2% of the time for any monkey in a given condition. For
this reason, dropout rates were not included in subsequent analyses. Analyses described below
were carried out in SPSS. Data initially were analyzed as a function of species, but no effects of
that factor were found. In addition, species was not a variable of interest for this study, and so I
collapsed across species for all subsequent analyses.
Latency-to-choose data were found to be non-normally distributed. Consequently, a nonparametric Friedman’s test was utilized here. I found that the choice condition (LC, IC, EC) to
which the monkey was assigned did not significantly affect the time it took them to choose a task
(X2(2) = 0.46, p = .794; Figure 6). Unlike in Experiment 1 with children, where participants only
partook in up to six trials, monkeys were able to engage in hundreds of trials in each condition.
Therefore, I was able to analyze monkeys’ global rate of switching in each condition rather than
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on a trial-by-trial basis as I had for the children. Like monkeys’ latency-to-choose data, the
switching data were non-normally distributed, and a non-parametric Friedman’s test was utilized
for analysis. Consistent with the latency-to-choose result, choice condition did not have a
significant effect on overall task switching (X2(2) = 3.80, p = .149; Figure 7).

Figure 6. The average time it took monkeys to select a task in each
choice condition. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure 7. Monkeys’ overall proportion of task switching as a function of
choice condition. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

44

PARADOX OF CHOICE

45

The data on latency to complete tasks were found to be normally distributed and did not
violate the assumption of sphericity. Therefore, a one-way repeated measures ANOVA was used
to investigate the effect of choice condition on latency to complete the tasks. The choice
conditions (LC, IC, EC) did not significantly affect the time it took monkeys to complete the
tasks (F(2, 24) = 1.689, p = .210; Figure 8).
In short, of the three measures analyzed here, I did not find any evidence to support the
hypothesis that monkeys would experience choice overload at larger arrays: the monkeys did not
demonstrate any significant differences in latency to choose a task, latency to complete a task, or
propensity to switch from one task to another in back-to-back trials based on the choice
condition (LC, IC, or EC) to which they were assigned in each test session. Although it is
possible that these results indicate that monkeys, unlike humans, are not prone to the effects of
choice overload, I speculate that monkeys likely do experience choice overload in some
instances, but our design was not sensitive enough to find these effects.

Figure 8. The average time it took monkeys to complete tasks in each
condition (“task performance”). Error bars represent 95% confidence
intervals.
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Experiment 2b: Investigating choice condition preference in monkeys
In this experiment, monkeys were able to choose their choice condition (LC, IC, or EC)

instead of the choice condition being assigned to them, as they were in Experiment 2a. I
hypothesized that monkeys, like adult humans, would exhibit a preference for larger arrays (the
EC condition) over smaller arrays (the LC and IC conditions). I analyzed the relative proportions
each condition was chosen out of 600 trials2. The proportion data were found to be non-normally
distributed. I first conducted a non-parametric Friedman’s ANOVA and found there was a
significant difference in the proportions the choice icons were chosen (X2 = 18.39, p <.001). A
post hoc analysis with Wilcoxon signed-rank was conducted with a Bonferroni correction
applied, resulting in a significance level set at p < .016. The results indicated that the proportion
of LC and IC choices were not significantly different (Z = -1.71, p = .087). However, monkeys
did choose the EC condition significantly more than the LC condition (39.4% compared to
28.0% of the time, respectively; Z = -3.18; p = .001) and the IC condition (39.4% to 32.6%; Z = 2.98, p = .003). These results corresponded with my hypothesis that monkeys would demonstrate
a greater preference for the EC condition over the other two conditions.
Additionally, using three Sign tests, I explored whether the proportion each of the
condition icons was chosen significantly differed from what the null hypothesis would predict
(chance level of 33%). The Sign tests revealed that the LC and IC conditions were not chosen at
proportions significantly different than chance (LC: p = .092; IC: p = .581). The proportion at
which the monkeys chose the EC condition was determined to be significantly greater than
chance (p < .001).

2

Two female capuchin monkeys did not complete all 600 trials. However, they each completed at least 300
trials. Because the analyses were run on proportion data, I included these monkeys’ data even though they had fewer
than 600 trials.
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I also conducted a Chi square test on each individual monkeys’ proportion of choices
using VassarStats.net. Five of the 13 monkeys exhibited a significant preference for the EC
option. Five monkeys showed a significant bias against the LC or IC options (Table 6).
Table 6. Results of Chi square tests. Monkeys who completed all 600 trials had an expected raw
count of 200 in each cell should the null hypothesis not be rejected. Expected raw counts for
monkeys who did not complete all 600 trials (Gretel and Lychee) were calculated by dividing
their total trial count by three. Cell values that fell outside of the expected distribution range are
signified with an asterisk. Monkey species is indicated by cap (capuchin) or mac (rhesus
macaque).
Monkey

LC raw count

IC raw count

EC raw count

Expected

Chi

(stand. resid.)

(stand. resid.)

(stand. resid.)

raw count

square

Species

p-value

Gambit

Cap

78 (-8.63)*

261 (4.31)*

261 (4.31)*

200

111.63

<.001

Griffin

Cap

172 (-1.98)*

186 (-0.99)

242 (2.97)*

200

13.72

.0001

Gretel

Cap

87 (-1.58)

102 (-0.10)

120 (1.68)

103

5.30

.070

Ingrid

Cap

179 (-1.48)

205 (0.35)

216 (1.13)

200

3.61

.164

Irene

Cap

202 (.014)

178 (-1.56)

220 (1.41)

200

4.44

.108

Lily

Cap

150 (-3.54)*

202 (0.14)

248 (3.39)*

200

24.04

<.001

Logan

Cap

181 (-1.34)

188 (-0.85)

231 (2.19)*

200

7.33

.025

Lychee

Cap

160 (0.54)

146 (-0.59)

154 (0.05)

153.33

.64

.726

Wren

Cap

209 (0.64)

171 (-2.05)*

220 (1.41)

200

6.61

.036

Chewie

Mac

204 (0.28)

187 (-0.92)

209 (0.64)

200

1.33

.514

Han

Mac

177 (-1.63)

197 (-0.21)

226 (1.84)

200

6.07

.048

Murph

Mac

183 (-1.2)

202 (0.14)

215 (1.06)

200

2.59

.273

Obi

Mac

77 (-8.70)*

158 (-2.97)*

365 (11.67)*

200

220.59

<.001
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6

DISCUSSION

The aim for this study was to determine whether and to what degree very young children
and nonhuman primates exhibit the paradox of choice effect: an attraction to larger arrays over
smaller arrays but experiencing negative consequences when choosing from larger arrays. I
hypothesized that children and monkeys would fall prey to the paradox of choice, such that they
would experience more negative consequences in the extensive choice (EC) condition relative to
the intermediate choice (IC) condition and the limited choice (LC) condition but would also
exhibit a strong preference for choosing from the EC condition.
To explore the presence of this phenomenon in these populations, I first investigated
whether children and monkeys would experience choice overload, the negative consequences
associated with too many options (Experiments 1a and 2a, respectively). Then I wished to
establish whether children and monkeys would demonstrate a preference for the larger arrays,
even after potentially exhibiting negative consequences from choosing among arrays of that size
(Experiments 1b and 2b). However, the COVID-19 pandemic caused testing to be cut short with
children, leading me to collect fewer trials than anticipated in Experiment 1a and unable to
conduct Experiment 1b.
Despite this setback, the results of Experiment 1a provide some evidence that children
experienced choice overload at the IC and EC conditions, such that children exhibited
approximately twice the odds of switching (i.e., exchanging a selected toy for a different prize)
in the IC and EC condition as they were to switch in the LC condition. These results were not
found to be statistically significant at p < .05, but the results had a large effect size, were trending
in the expected direction, and may have reached statistical significance had I completed the study
as expected and had greater power. If I were to interpret these results as being true evidence of
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choice overload, it would be interesting to note that children exhibit choice overload in the IC
condition (when choosing among six toys) nearly to the same degree as they seem to exhibit
choice overload in the EC condition, because six alternatives is often used at the limited choice
condition in experiments with adult humans. If this is a real effect, it is possible that young
children may experience choice overload at six alternatives when adults do not because of
children’s more limited working memory and cognitive control compared to adults (Alloway et
al., 2006; Gathercole et al., 2004); but more research would need to be conducted to answer this
question. Additionally, future research may want to manipulate the time children are given to
play with the toy before they must make the decision to switch. The longer the child interacts
with the toy, the more susceptible they may be to the endowment effect (a tendency to value an
object more than it is really worth simply because you feel a sense of ownership for the object;
Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Thaler, 1980) and the less likely they may be to switch.
Children also took significantly longer to make a choice in the EC condition than in
either of the other two conditions. It is possible that this was a sign of choice overload; that is,
that this latency was a reflection of a more difficult decision-making process in the EC condition
compared to the other conditions. However, it is also well within the realm of possibilities that
this effect can be entirely explained by scanning time. The EC condition, by its nature, had more
options for the children to visually investigate, and therefore took longer for the child to inspect
each toy one by one. I had argued in the introduction that if the results revealed that children
exhibited disproportionately longer latency to choose a toy in the EC condition than in other
conditions, this may be interpreted as choice overload; however, that is not the case here, and
accordingly, I am not interpreting the latency-to-choose data as evidence of choice overload in
children. However, it is interesting to note that the relationship between latency to make a choice
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and choice set size seems more exponential in nature than linear; at least, there was a qualitative
jump in the time it took to make a choice between the IC and EC condition that seemed to reflect
something more than a linear increase in looking time.
Finally, I analyzed children’s satisfaction data in each choice condition. I hypothesized
that children would exhibit decreased satisfaction in the EC condition compared to the other two
condition, a consequence typical of choice overload. The results trended in this direction:
children reported lower satisfaction scores in the EC and IC condition compared to the LC
condition, although this difference was only significant for the IC-LC comparison. However,
previous research had indicated that Likert scales are an unreliable tool for measuring children’s
happiness (Mellor & Moore, 2013). We found this to be true in our own study as well: There was
little variability in satisfaction rating between children or conditions, such that children almost
always chose the largest smiley face. In fact, the largest smiley was chosen 176 times in total,
whereas the four other smileys were chosen for a combined total of 35 times. Furthermore,
anecdotally we observed that some children declared in the first or second trial that they were
always going to choose the largest smiley in the subsequent trials, and some children chose the
largest smiley even when they verbally expressed dissatisfaction during the trial. In cases that
children did vary from the largest-smiley response, children often gave explanations for this
decision that were unrelated to their satisfaction with their toy selection (i.e., because the smiley
was cute, because the smiley represented them (the child) and the other smileys represented their
family members, etc.). For these reasons, I considered these satisfaction rating analyses to be
secondary to the latency-to-choose and switching analyses.
Because there was little variability in the rating data and because children often gave
reasons unrelated to their satisfaction for making their rating-score decisions, I hesitate to draw
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any conclusions from these results at this point in time. Replication of these results or a more
reliable means of testing children’s satisfaction scores would enable me to say with greater
confidence how choice condition affects children’s satisfaction.
The data did not reveal any evidence of choice overload for the monkeys. Despite
collecting multiple measures to assess possible choice overload effects, it seemed that choice
condition did not significantly impact the monkeys on any of these measures. It is possible that
this evidence reflects that monkeys do not experience choice overload at all. Choice overload
may be a human-unique phenomenon driven by cultural influences, especially in WEIRD
(Western, educated, industrialized, rich, developed; Henrich et al., 2010) societies. The virtually
limitless options granted by the internet and international trade, coupled with the Western value
of personal freedom, may have influenced WEIRD humans to become “maximizers” at a
population level, driven to always search for a better option. Alternatively, monkeys, who are not
exposed to these cultural pressures, may be “satisficers” on the whole, content with ‘good
enough’ alternatives and therefore less susceptible to choice overload.
Humans may also be uniquely susceptible to choice overload because of the personal
accountability they place on their decisions. Scheibehenne and colleagues (2009) demonstrated
the role that personal accountability plays on choice overload in their study, where participants
were informed that they could choose to donate to a charity from a group, but that they would
have justify their choice of charity. Participants who were presented with the smaller (five
option) assortment were more likely to donate than were participants who were presented with
the larger (40 option) assortment (Scheibehenne et al., 2009). Without the justification
manipulation, the opposite was found: individuals were more likely to donate to a charity if they
chose from the larger array. If personal accountability is a driving factor of choice overload – a
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sentiment we cannot attribute to nonhuman animals – this may explain why I did not find
evidence of choice overload in monkeys in my study.
However, I speculate that monkeys likely do experience choice overload in some
circumstances, although probably to a lesser degree than do adult humans because of the reasons
described above. This experiment was the first to test this question, and though it was a valuable
first attempt at evoking choice overload in monkeys, I believe the methodology was not sensitive
enough to reveal any real effects even if monkeys are susceptible to choice overload.
It is important to remember that larger arrays, in and of themselves, do not lead to choice
overload; rather, it is the presence of moderators that induce choice overload effects at larger
arrays (Chernev et al., 2015). The primary moderator included in this study was increased choice
set complexity through the elimination of a dominant option/ideal point. I attempted to control
for the presence of a dominant option by creating three tasks that monkeys nearly equally
preferred. Further variability was introduced by creating three difficulty levels within each task.
So that monkeys would not seek out the EC condition only because it would have a higher
likelihood of having an easy version of a preferred task, the program concealed the difficulty
levels of the tasks by only ever displaying one icon for each task, and randomly generating the
difficulty level after the icon was selected. However, by creating equivalently preferred tasks and
hiding the difficulty level of the task, it is possible that I took away the experience of choosing
among six or nine seemingly different alternatives in the IC and EC conditions, respectively,
despite my best efforts to do otherwise. In other words, monkeys may not have perceived the six
and nine sets as different from three. Because the icons gave no indication of the difficulty level
of the task, monkeys likely perceived the set of nine icons as three icons that indicate MAZE of
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unknown difficulty, three icons that indicate DEFLECT of unknown difficulty, and three icons
that indicate CHASE of unknown difficulty, rather than nine separate tasks.
We may consider an analogy using the Iyengar and Lepper (2000) jam experiment. The
monkeys’ choices icons that provide no indication of the difficulty level of the task would be
comparable to human subjects choosing among unmarked jams in just three colors, so that there
are three basic flavors, but then varieties within each flavor that are unknown at the time of
choice. In this hypothetical experiment, the humans would be able to choose among a few
different unmarked jams (limited choice condition) or many different unmarked jams (extensive
choice condition). The participants know some of the jams will be delicious (just as the monkeys
know sometimes the tasks will be easy) and some jams will be less to their liking (like
sometimes the tasks will be difficult) but participants will have no way of knowing which jam
will be which until after they have made a selection. In this case, it is likely that people would
not experience a strong preference between choosing from many jams or a few, because their
ability to make a knowledgeable decision that would lead to a desirable outcome is equally
limited in all scenarios.
There is another important methodological difference that must be acknowledged
between most human studies – including the one I conducted with young children – and the
study conducted with monkeys here: in human studies, the participants are choosing among
options that are their ultimate prize (i.e., jams or toys), whereas the monkeys in this study are
choosing among options that were a proxy for their ultimate prize (the pellet). Especially
considering that these monkeys are experts at completing computer tasks for pellet rewards (and,
it is worth noting, expertise reportedly decreases one’s susceptibility to choice overload;
Chernev, 2003; Chernev et al., 2015; Mogilner et al., 2008). Thus, it could have been a
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consequence of equating task value that there was no reason for a monkey to concern themselves
over whether they were choosing a MAZE icon from a set of three or a CHASE icon from a set
of nine; to the monkey, they may all have just represented a mildly enjoyable task icon that took
some number of seconds to a pellet reward. Monkeys also had many more chances to make
selections, so if overload is tied to some level of “regret” over missed options, that may be
washed out by their ability to choose many times. Of course, there is no way to assess whether
monkey feel something akin to regret.
Although the monkeys did not demonstrate evidence of choice overload, some monkeys
did exhibit the expected preference for larger arrays (EC) over smaller arrays (IC and LC). These
data were analyzed using a Chi square tests and, although one assumption of Chi square tests is
that each observation is independent, in this case I treated each monkey as its own population,
and the observations recorded in this experiment as a sample of this “population.” This is
consistent with the expanse of literature that informs us that animals prefer having choices.
Because my experiment did not appear to evoke any negative consequences when faced with
larger arrays, it is unsurprising that monkeys demonstrated a preference for more alternatives.
This study was the first to attempt to evoke choice overload in monkeys, and future
studies may want to examine presenting approximately equivalent options that still allow for
meaningfully distinct options as choices. One consideration is to present the same task but with
each option within that task presenting slightly different aesthetic appearances, such as the shape
of the cursor or the target, or to create nine (or more) completely distinct tasks or other such
choice alternatives with visually distinct icons to create distinct and meaningful choices in each
condition. Another future direction may include providing options that are not food-related, such
as social scenarios or enrichment items, or testing monkeys and adult humans on an equitable
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task and comparing results. In short, more research is necessary before any conclusions can be
drawn about monkeys’ susceptibility (or lack of susceptibility) to the paradox of choice
phenomenon.
In summary, I found tentative evidence that young children, at least, may experience
choice overload when a clearly preferred choice is not available to them. I did not find evidence
that monkeys experienced choice overload, although I cannot say whether this is because
monkeys are immune to choice overload or whether the design of this study failed to evoke the
negative consequences of too many options. The goal for this study was to answer the question
“Is the paradox of choice a phenomenon shared with other species?” Unfortunately, the results
did not provide a definitive answer. However, I believe that this study sets the stage for future
research on this topic by demonstrating the necessity of using choice alternatives that are,
themselves, the reward (rather than proxies for reward), and which are not so similar to one
another that the perception of choice is eliminated altogether when testing nonhuman primates.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A: Instructions and Script for Experiment 1a
1. Before bringing the child into the room, or while they are not looking, use the child’s
sheet to determine which toys (balls, animals, or cars) they will be using, how many, and
which colors/animals should not be included. Put the toys into an opaque bin so they do
not see the toy options before testing begins
2. Bring the child outside the classroom to pick their toys.
3. Say the following:
I am about to show you some toys. You will get to choose one of these toys to take
home today as your prize for doing such a good job. However, today there is a
special rule when you pick out your prize: you can’t touch any of the toys until
you are sure which one you would like to take home. You can look at the toys for
as long as you want, but as soon as you touch one, that is the one you will have to
take home. Do you understand this rule?
4. Dump the toys out and immediately begin timing the child. You can arrange some of
them if they are jumbled or on top of each other, but if the child touches a toy, that is
their selection for the day.
5. As soon as the child touches a toy, stop the timer, and announce that they’ve made their
selection. (record the time on the data sheet)
6. Put the rest of the toys back into the opaque bin.
7. Tell the child you need to do some paperwork really quickly, and encourage them to play
with their toy while they wait. Pretend to busy yourself (or fill out the data sheet) while
the child plays with the toy for 60 seconds.
8. Ask the child:
Would you like to exchange your toy? If you want, you can put this toy back and
choose again from the same options that you just saw. Would you like to do that
today, or do you want to keep the toy you already chose?
9. If they don’t want to exchange, ask them how satisfied they are with the toy they chose
(see number 11)
10. If they say they would like to exchange, put their first choice toy back into the bin and
dump them out again. You do not need to time the child during this time, but the notouching rule still applies.
11. Once a final selection has been made, ask them how happy they are with the toy they
chose using the script below and showing them the satisfaction scale. Score it on data
sheet as 1-5 (1 = smallest smiley, 5 = biggest smiley).
How happy are you with the toy you chose today? Point to the face that shows
how happy you are – the bigger the face means the happier you are. There are
no wrong answers, and you’ll get to keep your prize no matter what.
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Appendix B: Favorites Questionnaire
What is your favorite color?

What is your second favorite color?

What is your favorite animal?

What is your second favorite animal?

What is your favorite toy?
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Appendix C: Smiley Face Likert Scale
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